Proposal #349
Passed on 22 Oct 2022 with 46.4% of the votes for yes.
Yes
46.4%
97.8% without abstain
Veto
0.0%
of votes cast
Ended
22 Oct 2022
46.43%
of votes cast
52.55%
of votes cast
0.99%
of votes cast
0.04%
of votes cast
By voting YES on this proposal, OSMO stakers voice their support for removing OSMO incentives from the OSMO/ROWAN pool (#629) on Osmosis.
By voting NO on this proposal, OSMO stakers voice their dissent in removing OSMO incentives from the OSMO/ROWAN pool (#629) on Osmosis.
This is an incentives adjustment proposal to remove all incentives from the Sifchain pool OSMO/ROWAN(#629) upon completion, as well as signalling removal from the set of assets that receive OSMO liquidity incentives. The current OSMO APR is 69% and the Swap Fee APR is 53% a staggered exit is not planned.
This proposal argues that ROWAN liquidity should remain entirely on Sifchain to facilitate their experimental tokenomics and so Osmosis should cease renting an alternative site of liquidity.
The most recent experiment is DEX Liquidity Protection which was implemented in the recent software upgrade on the 30th September. This mechanism allows only 2,000,000 net ROWAN to be sold every 24 hours, therefore increasing the stability of the ROWAN price on Sifchain. This cap was immediately hit and has led to a 4x price discrepancy between ROWAN on Sifchain and that transferred off.
This cap has effectively prevented a normal user from selling their ROWAN on Sifchain as the sale allowance per block is consumed by bots attempting to normalise the on and off-chain prices. If a user wishes to remove liquidity they must accept the loss regardless by exiting through other exchanges such as Osmosis. Conversely, a user entering ROWAN may purchase on Osmosis and move to Sifchain where they make a theoretical instant 4x profit that is un-redeemable at that value.
This results in almost all volume passing through Osmosis. Continued incentivisation in the face of this increased volume as users accept their losses or chase an un-redeemable gain will cause a greater and greater share of Osmosis Liquidity Incentives to be allocated to the pool, the liquidity to increase further, and any ROWAN token disparity require more days of arbitrage sales to rectify.
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