Authors: Lexa Michaelides, Mai Ishikawa Sutton, Sacha Saint-Leger, Sam Hart, Udit Vira

Download the full IPFS pin of proposal (including detailed technical and historical context) [Hidden link]. See active discussion on the forum [Hidden link].

Summary

This proposal aims to put forward a clear definition of ‘NoWithVeto’ that provides a stand-alone reference for future Cosmos Hub votes. We examine the technical context and existing discussion on ‘NoWithVeto’, and the range of ways the community understands NoWithVeto. We bridge these ideas into a coherent and thorough definition proposed below.

If passed, changes will be made to the Cosmos Hub documentation and Cosmos Hub Forum templates to reflect the newly accepted definition.

Proposed Definition for NoWithVeto

“A ‘NoWithVeto’ vote indicates a proposal either (1) is deemed to be spam, i.e., irrelevant to Cosmos Hub, (2) disproportionately infringes on minority interests, or (3) violates or encourages violation of the rules of engagement as currently set out by Cosmos Hub governance.”

Note: In this definition we use the term “rules of engagement” to refer to practices adopted by the Cosmos Hub community through governance. These may include decision-making processes and social protocols that have passed governance and thus been accepted as rules.

The following is factually correct about how ‘NoWithVeto’ currently operates and will continue to operate regardless of this proposal’s outcome: If quorum is met and greater than 1/3 of participating voting power have voted ‘NoWithVeto’, the proposal fails and is considered to be vetoed. In this case the proposal deposit is burned rather than being returned to respective depositors.

Discussion

Summary of existing definitions

This list summarises the range of ways community members understand the definition of ‘NoWithVeto’. Definitions 2, 3, and 4 are represented in our proposed definition.

1. As a stronger No: ‘NoWithVeto’ allows voters to show stronger disagreement than simply voting No.
2. As a spam filter: It provides a means for the community to impose a cost on the depositor for putting forward irrelevant material.
3. As a protection of minority interests: ‘NoWithVeto’ allows a 1/3+ minority who is against the proposal require a 2/3 ‘Yes’ supermajority (rather than a simple >1/2 majority) to pass a proposal, which protects minorities from rule changes they didn't sign up for when joining the community. However this introduces the possibility of gridlock where a minority blocks a governance proposal that the majority wants to pass. Because voting is not private, ‘NoWithVeto’ voters (who likely hold a minority opinion) make themselves potential targets for being forked out of the chain in order for the majority to pass a proposal. Therefore protection of minority interests comes with the acceptance of the risk of being forcibly forked out of the protocol.
4. As a means of introducing a cost for proposals made in bad faith: ‘NoWithVeto’ imposes a consequence for a proposal that does not follow the rules of engagement by ensuring the proposer’s deposit is burned (e.g., a proposal where the description text knowingly misrepresents what the code does).
5. As a way to safeguard against censorship: Since 1/3+ voting power can always block a proposal from passing by censoring transactions as per the underlying consensus mechanism, ‘NoWithVeto’ provides an accountable “in-protocol” method for 1/3+ of the voting power to prevent a proposal from passing. In this way it upholds a core value of blockchain technology: censorship resistance.
6. As a way to protect against community divisions: It allows voters to signal that they would rather exit the network than see the proposal pass. If a significant proportion of the community (i.e., 1/3+ of the participating voting power) are considering leaving the network, the proposal fails, thereby leaving the community intact.

Censorship

It may not always be correct to invoke the underlying consensus mechanism as justification for the 1/3+ ‘NoWithVeto’ threshold: In particular, consensus can be threatened by one third of the total voting power (i.e., all staked ATOM) while a proposal can be vetoed by one third of the participating voting power (i.e., quorum of 40% of all staked ATOM). Thus the consensus threat requires at least 33.3% of the total voting power to censor transactions or halt the chain, but a governance proposal can be vetoed by only 13.2% of the total voting power when voter turnout is low.

Financial and social cost

‘NoWithVeto’ has no immediate additional financial cost to the voters, who can veto a proposal (and thus burn deposits) with a minimum of 13.2% of the voting power. An overuse of ‘NoWithVeto’ may discourage good proposals from being put to a vote as proposers will fear their deposits could be burned.

Consequently voters need social consensus on the meaning of ‘NoWithVeto’ beyond representing a particularly strong ‘No’ vote because in absence of this, there may be no reason to ever vote ‘No’ instead of ‘NoWithVeto’ aside from reputational cost.

While there is no financial cost to casting a ‘NoWithVeto’ vote instead of ‘No’, there are potential social and reputational costs in the form of scrutiny and questioning from the community. Since voting isn’t private, ‘Yes’ voters can always coordinate off-chain to remove the stake of those voters who’ve revealed their ‘NoWithVeto’ preference, thereby shutting them out of the chain. In this way, a minority of voters are only able to veto an idea for so long before it becomes potentially attractive to the majority to remove them.

Conclusion

We are proposing that ‘NoWithVeto’ is not “a stronger No” but neither is it a “signal for exit.” Its purpose is to encourage the sharing of ideas and discussion in good faith. Additionally the burn process is intended to impose a cost on spam proposals or those that would cause significant negative impact by way of infringing on minority interests or violating the rules of engagement.

Cosmos Hub has a vibrant but young governance system. We hope that ‘NoWithVeto’ can continue to be a valuable tool for good governance.

Voting options

We propose the following definition for ‘NoWithVeto’:

“A ‘NoWithVeto’ vote indicates a proposal either (1) is deemed to be spam, i.e., irrelevant to Cosmos Hub, (2) disproportionately infringes on minority interests, or (3) violates or encourages violation of the rules of engagement as currently set out by Cosmos Hub governance.”

Your vote on this proposal indicates the following:

• YES - You agree with the definition of ‘NoWithVeto’ established in this proposal.
• NO - You disagree with the definition of ‘NoWithVeto’ established in this proposal. Please indicate why in the [Hidden link].
• NO WITH VETO - ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ If the number of ‘NoWithVeto’ votes is greater than a third of total votes, the proposal is rejected and the deposits are burned.
• ABSTAIN - You wish to contribute to quorum but you formally decline to vote either for or against the proposal.